Gregory N. Oliver v. State of Utah : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Gregory N. Oliver v. State of Utah : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Elizabeth Holbrook; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Petitioner.
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation









IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY N. OLIVER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petition for Rehearing of an opinion affirming a judgment 
and conviction for burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-202, and remanding for the entry of a 
judgment and conviction for theft, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Marian Decker 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
F k' U 
OCT 91991 
tfclerk of tno • 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY N. OLIVER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petition for Rehearing of an opinion affirming a judgment 
and conviction for burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-202, and remanding for the entry of a 
judgment and conviction for theft, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Marian Decker 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REASSESS THE DUE PROCESS 
ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECORD OF THIS CASE. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REASSESS THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ISSUE IN LIGHT OF TEMPLIN. 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Brown v. Pickard. 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) 1 
Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913) 1 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) 3 
Robinson v. City Court for City of Qqden. 185 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1947) 3 
State v. Barker. 667 P.2d 108 (Wash. App. 1983) . . . . 3, 4 
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) 2 
State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1988) 2 
State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 4 
State v. Tempi in. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) 5, 6 
State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985) 3 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GREGORY N. OLIVER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 890625-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Oliver requests rehearing of this case. See Brown v. 
Pickard. 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing 
rehearing); Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913)(same). 
A copy of the Oliver opinion is in Appendix 1. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REASSESS THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECORD OF THIS CASE. 
The Oliver opinion's discussion of the due process issue 
omits the actual basis of the motion for continuance—trial 
counsel's plain and broad admission: 
I didn't do any formal trial preparation that I 
normally do for a trial such as this, and 
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to 
trial. 
(T. 4). 
Oliver proceeds to set forth the following standards under 
which to evaluate the motion for continuance in this case: 
When moving for a continuance, a party must 
show that denial of the motion will prevent the 
party from obtaining material and admissible 
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks 
can be produced within a reasonable time, and 
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing 
for the case before requesting the continuance, 
Oliver at 3, citing State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). 
The Linden standards relied on in Oliver are inapposite to 
this case because those standards are designed for the evaluation of 
motions for continuances based on the need to obtain testimony from 
absent witnesses. See Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, at 1387 (explaining 
that the defense motion to continue based on the need to procure the 
testimony of out of state witnesses did not meet the Creviston 
standards); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1982)(setting forth standards for continuance motions based on the 
need for testimony of absent witnesses). 
The basis for the continuance motion in this case was that 
trial counsel had done no formal trial preparation and was not 
prepared to proceed (T. 4). Thus, there was no obligation for 
counsel to meet the Linden/Creviston standards for continuances 
needed to obtain the testimony of absent witnesses. Further, 
because trial counsel had done no formal trial preparation (T. 4), 
he was in no position to identify material and admissible evidence, 
or to demonstrate*, that any additional witnesses could be produced 
within a reasonable time. 
When the trial court learned that trial counsel had done no 
formal trial preparation and was not prepared to go to trial, 
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regardless of why that was the case, the trial court should have 
recognized that Mr. Oliver's right to due process of law was at 
stake, and granted the continuance. E.g. Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). Mr. Oliver's apparent vacillation during the 
plea bargaining process should not have been punished with the 
sacrifice of his due process rights. Cf. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 
703 (Utah 1985)(defendant's appeal was improperly dismissed after he 
escaped; his escape should not have been punished through the 
forfeiture of his right to appeal). While the trial court had the 
power to discipline any violation of the court's order for timely 
trial preparation, the trial court should not have sacrificed 
Mr. Oliver's due process rights to a prepared defense against the 
criminal charges. See Robinson v. City Court for City of Ocrden, 185 
P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1947)(the purpose of contempt statutes "is to 
protect litigants and the public from the mischievous danger of an 
unfree and coerced tribunal."). 
In assessing the prejudice resulting from the denial of the 
motion for continuance, the Oliver opinion states, 
We are also persuaded by Washington precedent, 
that on appeal, the moving party must show that 
it was materially prejudiced by the court's 
denial of the continuance or that the trial 
result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted. 
Oliver at 4 (emphasis added), citing State v. Barker. 667 P.2d 108, 
114 (Wash. App. 1983). 
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The Oliver paraphrase of the Washington standard stems from 
dicta in Barker, and is worded more stringently than the actual 
Washington standard set forth in the Barker opinion: 
Moreover, "[t]he decision to deny the defendant a 
continuance will be disturbed on appeal only upon 
a showing that the defendant was prejudiced or 
that the result of the trial would likely have 
been different had the motion been granted." 
State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983)(emphasis added; 
citations omitted). 
In applying the prejudice analysis to the facts of this 
case, the Oliver opinion concludes that Mr. Oliver has failed to 
show that the result would have been different had trial counsel 
been given time to prepare. Oliver reasons that trial counsel's 
discussions of weaknesses in eyewitness identifications during 
Mr. Oliver's testimony, during cross-examination of the State's 
witnesses, and during closing argument were adequate; and that the 
evidence and information identified by Mr. Oliver on appeal is 
merely cumulative to the information presented by trial counsel. 
Id. at 5. This assessment overlooks the nature of eyewitness 
identification testimony and the weakness of Mr. Oliver's 
credibility. 
This case turned on eyewitness identification, which has 
been recognized as unreliable, and as a type of evidence that jurors 
are prone to believe, despite effective cross-examination and 
cautionary instructions. See State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-491 
(Utah 1986). 
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While Mr. Oliver did briefly mention the previous 
misidentification case (wherein he was convicted of a crime he did 
not commit on the basis of eyewitness identifications), and while 
defense counsel mentioned his testimony during closing argument, the 
jurors had reasons to disbelieve Mr. Oliver. Mr. Oliver admitted to 
his criminal conviction involving a forged prescription, which was 
apparently a valid criminal conviction involving dishonesty 
(T. 149-150). The jurors were provided testimony that employees of 
Adult Probation and Parole suspected Mr. Oliver committed this crime 
(T. 116, 124). 
Had the jurors seen court documents and evidence concerning 
the previous case (in which Mr. Oliver's conviction was based on 
eyewitness identification testimony, and which conviction was later 
reversed when the true criminals were found), the result likely 
would have been different. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REASSESS 
THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ISSUE 
IN LIGHT OF TEMPLIN. 
Olivers analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue again omits the fundamental basis of Mr. Oliver's claim—trial 
counsel's admission: 
I didn't do any formal trial preparation that I 
normally do for a trial such as this, and 




The Oliver opinion indicates that trial counsel's 
performance was not deficient because the evidence that trial 
counsel did not present was cumulative to evidence that trial 
counsel did present. Oliver at 6. Because the Oliver opinion 
concludes that the failure to present cumulative evidence is not 
deficient perfo3rmance, the opinion declines to address whether the 
absence of the evidence was prejudicial. Id. 
This assessment overlooks the Tempiin decision, which 
recognizes a duty of trial counsel to investigate possible defense 
witnesses to bolster a defendant's testimony: cumulative evidence, 
See State v. Tempiin. 805 P.2d 182, 187-188 (Utah 1990). As in 
Tempiin, trial counsel's failure to prepare to support the 
defendant's testimony in this case constituted deficient 
performance. See id. 
As is demonstrated in the prejudice discussion in Point I 
of this petition, supra at 4 through 5, trial counsel's failure to 
prepare this case was prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Oliver requests rehearing of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 1991, 
ELIZABETH HOLBR001 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Greg N. Oliver appeals his conviction of burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1939) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1989) on the bases that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a continuance and that admissible 
evidence supports only a misdemeanor theft conviction. We affirm 
in part, and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
At 2:30 p.m. on January 7, 1989, John Spielmans returned heme 
from a basketball game with his son. He noticed that the side 
door to his garage, which was usually locked, was open. 
Spielmans went into the garage to investigate. He then saw a man 
dressed in a dark cap and dark jacket jump over a chain link 
fence ten to twelve feet away and run north. Spielmans began 
chasing the man, but lost sight of him. Spielmans returned home 
and noticed that the front door to his house was dented and that 
it appeared someone had been inside the house. He called 911 and 
waited outside for the police to arrive. While he was waiting, 
one of Spielmans1s neighbors called his attention to a man who 
was leaning against a wooden fence across the street. Noting the 
(MU> 472? /<!/ 
similarity of that person's clothing to that of the man he had 
observed running away, Spielmans concluded it was the same 
person. Spielmans walked toward the man, who began running 
toward a car parked nearby. The man got into the car and looked 
over his left shoulder as Spielmans approached him and said, "It 
wasn't me, man" before driving off. Spielmans again called 911 
and described the car, including the license plate number and the 
direction of travel. 
When Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate, Spielmans told 
him that a watch, a gold ring, four one-dollar bills and four or 
five gold Canadian coins were missing from his house. Deputy 
Matthews also spoke with Spielmans1 s neighbor who saw the man run 
across his front yard, climb into the parked car and speed away 
when Spielmans approached him. 
Deputy Matthews ran a computer check on the license plate of 
the car and obtained the vehicle owner's name and address. He 
then went to the vicinity of that address to investigate further. 
He saw a man fitting the description that Spielmans had given, 
exit the vehicle owner's residence. 
Based on his own observations, the license plate number of the 
car and the descriptions given by both Spielmans and his 
neighbor, Deputy Matthews obtained a picture of defendant, Greg 
N. Oliver, from the police records division. The next day, he 
returned to Spielmans's home with the photo of Oliver and showed 
it to Spielmans, advising him that he had reason to believe that 
Oliver was the same person Spielmans described. Spielmans 
identified Oliver as the man he had seen. 
Three days after the incident, Deputy Matthews assembled a 
photo spread, including the picture of Oliver and pictures of 
five other men. He showed the photo spread to Spielmans, who 
again identified Oliver as the suspect. Deputy Matthews also 
showed the photo spread to three of Spielmans*s neighbors, two of 
whom identified Oliver as the person they had observed the day of 
the incident. 
Oliver was arrested and charged with one count of burglary, a 
second degree felony and one count of theft, a third degree 
felony. 
The trial judge granted two continuances prior to the case 
actually being tried. At the final pretrial conference, on 
August 28, 1989, Oliver's attorney told the trial judge that he 
was ready to proceed to trial and agreed to a trial date of 
September 5, 1989. 
After the pretrial conference, Oliver entered into plea 
negotiations with the State. The trial judge's clerk told both 
the State and Oliver's attorney, however, to prepare as if they 
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were going to trial as scheduled. The night before trial, Oliver 
agreed to the State's plea proposal and decided that he would 
enter a guilty plea in the morning rather than go to trial. The 
next morning, however, Oliver changed his mind and decided that 
he wanted to go to trial. Oliver's attorney moved for a one day 
continuance, stating that he needed more time to formally prepare 
for trial. The trial judge denied this motion. Oliver was 
convicted by a jury of one count of second degree burglary and 
one count of third degree theft. 
ISSUES 
On appeal Oliver argues that: (1) the trial court's denial of 
his motion for a continuance denied him due process of law; 
(2) the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance 
denied him effective assistance of counsel; and (3) admissible 
evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft conviction. 
ANALYSIS 
Due Process 
Oliver argues that the trial court's denial of his motion for 
a one day continuance violated his right to due process because 
it forced his counsel to proceed to trial without being 
adequately prepared. Oliver asserts that his attorney did not 
conduct any formal trial preparation after Oliver decided to 
plead guilty. Consequently, when he changed his mind the next 
morning and decided he wanted to go to trial, Oliver's counsel 
was not sufficiently prepared. Oliver claims that had his 
attorney had one more day to prepare for trial, he would have 
been better prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony regarding 
his prior conviction based on misidentification; (2) expose 
weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; and 
(3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police 
misconduct involved in the photo show up. 
The grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Humphervs, 707 P. 2d 109, 109 (Utah 
1985) (per curiam); State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1982); State v. HoosTnan, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). This 
court, will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Id. 
When moving for a continuance, a party must show that denial 
of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and 
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can 
be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised 
due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the 
continuance. State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). 
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Absent such showing, the trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it denies the motion. Id. We are also persuaded 
by Washington precedent, that on appeal, the moving party must 
show that it was materially prejudiced by the court's denial of 
the continuance or that the trial result would have been 
different had the continuance been granted. State v. Barker. 667 
P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983). 
Oliver has failed to make the necessary showing required by 
these cases. Oliver's counsel did not allege that there were any 
witnesses or evidence that he needed to obtain or that would have 
been available had the continuance been granted. Nor did he 
state specifically what he needed to do, or how or why Oliver 
would be prejudiced if he was denied the extra day. Defense 
counsel simply requested time to conduct more formal trial 
preparation. 
Oliver's counsel also failed to demonstrate that he exercised 
due diligence before requesting the continuance. Oliver's 
attorney represented Oliver at an arrest warrant hearing, the 
pretrial conference and throughout plea negotiations with the 
State. At the pretrial conference, eight days before trial, 
defense counsel told the trial judge that he was prepared to 
proceed to trial. After the pretrial, the trial judge instructed 
his court clerk to notify both the State and defense counsel 
that, although Oliver and the State were engaged in plea 
negotiations, they should prepare as if they were going to trial 
anyway. The trial judge stated that Oliver was having a hard 
time deciding whether or not he would accept the State's plea 
bargain and that no one would know until the day of trial whether 
or not he would actually enter a plea. In denying the motion, 
the trial judge stated: 
All counsel, prosecution and defense 
counsel were told that given circumstances, 
as I understand them, that Mr. Oliver could 
not make up his mind, that everyone needed to 
proceed, as if we were going to trial, and the 
responses we got from the respective offices 
of prosecution and defense is that they would 
act accordingly. 
On appeal, Oliver has failed to show that he was materially 
prejudiced by denial of this motion. The trial lasted two days, 
instead of only one, as scheduled. Therefore, Oliver's counsel 
had the evening of the first day and overnight to further prepare 
before the State's case had been fully presented. In essence, 
because the trial went two days, Oliver's counsel was afforded 
the time to prepare that he requested and which he would have had 
if the continuance had been granted. All of the State's 
witnesses were subject to recall by defense counsel and the trial 
judge found that defense counsel took full advantage of the 
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opportunity to cross-examine each of them. Also, because the 
motion was denied and the parties had to proceed to trial, one of 
the State's witnesses was unable to appear. At the end of the 
State's case, the trial judge made the following statement 
regarding his denial of Oliver's motion for a continuance: 
Each of the witnesses who testified 
yesterday it seemed to me, that there was 
full availability of cross-examination by 
[defense counsel] and he took advantage of 
that . . . I want to make sure the record is 
very clear that full opportunity had been 
made available to the defendant, to the 
witnesses . . . and in.fact, since the trial 
did not conclude in the first day, that there 
has been extra time to prepare, extra time to 
do whatever is necessary . . . . 
Furthermore, it appears to me that there 
may have been some benefit in the sense that 
this witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehaman, is 
not available. 
Further, Oliver has not shown that the trial result would have 
been different had the continuance been granted. The record 
shows that Oliver's counsel explored all of the areas Oliver now 
complains of. Defense counsel questioned Oliver about his 
previous conviction based on eye witness misidentification, and 
again brought the prior misidentification to the jury's attention 
during closing argument. He cross-examined each eyewitness who 
testified and addressed the weaknesses of each person's testimony 
at length in his closing argument. Defense counsel also cross-
examined Deputy Matthews about his investigation and the photo 
show up he conducted with at least one of the eyewitnesses. 
Oliver did net tell his attorney that he had decided to plead 
guilty until the night before trial. Any formal trial 
preparation should have been done before that time. Oliver dees 
not show that he was materially prejudiced by the court's denial 
of this motion or that the trial would have been different had 
the continuance been granted. Therefore, we find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a 
continuance and that such denial did not deprive Oliver of due 
process. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Oliver claims that the trial court's denial of his motion for 
a one day continuance denied him effective assistance of counsel. 
As in his due process argument, Oliver contends that his counsel 
was not sufficiently prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony 
regarding his prior conviction based on misidentification; 
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(2) expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; 
or (3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police 
misconduct involved in the photo show up. Oliver argues that his 
counsel's failure to more fully explore these issues constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 663, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984) , the United States Supreme Courx established a two-part 
test for determining whether a criminal defendant's sixth 
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been 
denied. The defendant must show: (1) that his or her counsel's 
performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 637, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The 
defendant must prove both parts of the test in order to prevail. 
Id-
An attorney's performance is deficient when it falls below the 
objective standard of reasonableness. Jd. at 638, 104 S. Ct. at 
2064-65; State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). The defendant must 
point to specific instances in the record which, under the 
circumstances, show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Templin, 805 
P.2d at 136; State v. Kovt, 306 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991). 
In assessing trial counsel's performance, an appellate court 
must " 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance . . . . '" Templin, 805 P. 2d at 136 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 
Although Oliver points to three specific areas in which he 
claims his counsel should have been more prepared, the record, as 
discussed regarding Oliver's due process claims, establishes that 
his attorney presented evidence and argument to the jury in all 
of these areas. Any additional evidence would have been 
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate how his counsel's 
performance was deficient and therefore we need not address 
whether Oliver was prejudiced by such performance. We conclude 
that Oliver was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 
Admissibility of Evidence 
Oliver argues that the State failed to introduce admissible 
evidence establishing that the value of the stolen property 
totalled over $250 as required for a third degree felony theft 
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conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b) (1989)-1 
Spielmans reported that a watch, a ring, four one-dollar bills 
and four or five Canadian coins were stolen from his home. At 
trial, Spielmans testified that the watch was worth one hundred 
twenty-five dollars, the four dollar bills were worth four 
dollars and that the total value of the coins was approximately 
three dollars and seventy-five cents. When questioned about the 
ring's value, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And at the time that the 
ring was taken, did you have an opinion as to 
the value of that ring? 
A. [SPIELMANS]: I did have, and whatever that 
opinion was is reflected in the police report. 
I don't recall. 
Q: You do not recall? 
A: No. 
Q: Is there anything that would help refresh 
your recollection? 
A: Nothing other than the police report, I 
believe. 
Q: I'm asking you if looking at the police 
report refreshes your recollection as to the 
ring. 
A: As to the ring? 
Q: As to the ring. Thank you. 
A: I'm sure it reflects what I said. I just 
don't recall. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1939) provides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this dx*ju=ir 
shall be punishable: 
. . . 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than 
$250 but not more than $1000; 
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Q: . . . Having looked at this report, this police 
report, does that refresh your recollection 
as to how you valued the ring at that time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. What was the value you placed on that ring 
at that time? 
A: I really can't recall. It states $200 on there. 
That's what I said. If it says $200 on there, that's 
what I said. 
The police report was not introduced into evidence. 
Oliver claims that Spielmans's testimony, based on the police 
report, that the ring was worth $200 is inadmissible because 
Spielmans lacked personal knowledge of the value and his memory 
was not refreshed by the police report. Therefore, Oliver 
contends that the State proved a total value of less than $250 
for the stolen property, which constitutes a class A misdemeanor 
under § 76-6-412(1) (c)2, rather than a felony. 
The State argues that the evidence presented is sufficient to 
sustain the felony conviction. Before we can assess whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support a felony theft conviction, we 
must first determine whether the evidence that the ring was worth 
$200 was properly admitted, as that evidence is necessary for a 
felony conviction. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we 
will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the 
party has been affected. State v. Morgan. 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 61, 
61 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Salt Lake Citv, v. Koltman. 306*?.2d 
235, 237 (Utah App. 1991)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may only testify 
about matters of which the witness has personal knowledge. A 
witness may use a writing to refresh his or her memory for the 
purpose of testifying. Utah R. Evid. 612(1). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (c) (1939) provides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this drsc&r 
shall be punishable: 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but does not 
exceed $250; 
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It is evident from the trial transcript that Spielmans had no 
independent knowledge or memory of the value of the ring, nor was 
his memory refreshed after looking at the police report. He had 
no present personal knowledge of the ring's value and, therefore, 
his testimony concerning the value is inadmissible. We find that 
admissible evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft 
conviction. Therefore, we reverse and remand on the felony theft 
conviction issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of the motion for a continuance, and reverse and remand on 
the felony theft conviction for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
< g > » g g * ^ ^ / * 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
l u s s e l i W. Bench, Judge 
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